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INTRODUCTION
Explaining why overlapping directorates1 exist is critical to disentangle 
the conscious or inadvertent reasons of these widespread interorganiza-
tional ties (Mizruchi, 1996). While ownership is supposed to give the right 
to vote for directors, this explanation has notwithstanding rarely been 
considered.2 Only recently Bohman (2012) assesses the probability that two 
* tristan.auvray@univ-paris13.fr
** olivier.brossard@sciencespo-toulouse.fr
1 A directorate interlock is created between two firms when a director of one of them 
is also on the board of the other firm: this is the board relationship we explain in 
this paper.
2 One noticeable exception is the paper by Berkowitz et al. (1978/1979) who show the 
strength of ownership and directorship ties inside business group.
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firms are interlocked if they have a common shareholder. He obtains that, 
when two firms have the same owner, then this owner is likely to appoint 
the same director to both firms. Nevertheless, studies on the determi-
nants of interlocking directorates seem to ignore that direct and indirect 
ownership ties between two companies may be both a strong incentive 
and a simple way to create directorship ties between these corporations.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the strength of the correlation 
between these financial and human networks. By doing so, we aim to 
shed light on a dark side of the financial control of corporations that has 
been somewhat overlooked since Berle and Means (1932). These authors 
undoubtedly give a very useful and practical definition of financial con-
trol. According to them, the main shareholder of a corporation can obtain 
control by obtaining 20% of its shares: based on its majority at general 
meetings due to the confidence or passivity of the other minority share-
holders, it can select the directors who then vote for the CEO. The CEO, 
therefore, can be assumed to represent the main shareholder.3 Conversely, 
when there is no powerful shareholder in the general meeting, manag-
ers can usurp power from the board to become a self-perpetuating oligar-
chy. Since Berle and Means, a corporation without a shareowner owning 
at least 20% or 10% of cash flow rights (CFR) or voting rights (VR) is con-
sidered as a management controlled firm. For instance, it is now admitted 
that in most countries managerial control is a myth because 10% to 20% 
of the VR in a typical listed company are held by the main shareholder 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Barca and Becht, 2001; Faccio 
and Lang, 2002; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Holderness, 2009; Carney and 
Child, 2013).
Nevertheless, this widely accepted definition of control is not exclusive 
from other forms of influence on the corporation. This is acknowledged 
by Berle and Means themselves when they provide their practical defini-
tion of control (1932, p. 69):
3 This form of control is very strong because majority in general meeting (even with a 
minority shareholding) provides control of the board (the vote for directors) but also 
a greater ability to monitor management, and some managerial duties (vote for CEO 
who controls the corporation on a day-to-day basis, approval of large transactions, 
and proposal of resolutions in general meeting on payout policy and on selection of 
new directors).
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“Control […], like sovereignty, its counterpart in the political field, is an elusive 
concept, for power can rarely be sharply segregated or clearly defined. Since direc-
tion over the activities of a corporation is exercised through the board of directors, 
we may say for practical purposes that control lies in the hands of the individual 
or group who have the actual power to select the board of directors, (or its major-
ity), either by mobilizing the legal right to choose them – ‘controlling’ a majority 
of the votes directly or through some legal device – or by exerting pressure which 
influences their choice.”
In this quote, and more generally in their book, Berle and Means provide 
three definitions of control. i) A strong form of control is the selection of 
directors thanks to a majority in general meeting (the well accepted def-
inition). ii) Other forms of pressure on the board exist (“influence”), like 
the one a banker exerts with or without restrictive covenants. As stressed 
by Mizruchi (2004), the subsequent literature on interlocking directorates 
explain how common board membership may be used as a means of exter-
nal influence, for example by bankers or clients and suppliers. iii) A weaker 
form of financial control may also occur as shown by the first sentence of 
this quote which indicates that defining a threshold of 20% for practical 
purpose is rather arbitrary. Berle and Means used this cut-off to assert that 
44% of the 200 largest US corporations were controlled by managers. But 
they also pointed out that, each time a shareholder held between 5% and 
20% of CFR in their sample, at least one of its representatives was on the 
board. Only 22% of their corporations had no shareholder with more than 
5% of CFR. Some authors, like Zeitlin (1974), used these numbers as a proof 
of the existence of a financial control in the US.4
More recently, La Porta et al. (1999, p. 496) acknowledge that, among the 
largest firms, the percentage of equity needed to actually control them is 
lower than the conventional thresholds of 20% or 10% of cash-flow rights 
(CFR) or voting rights (VR). For this reason, some authors (e.g. Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Barca and Becht, 2001) refer to blockholders with at least 5% 
shareholdings. According to Zwiebel (1995) a threshold of 1% is already 
important because it allows small blockholders to be part of a controlling 
coalition and to share the partial benefits of control.
4 To be sure, in the remainder of this article we keep the term “control” for the form i) 
and use the term “influence” for other financial and non-financial forms of pres-
sures on the board (ii and iii).
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All these theoretical and empirical studies show that there is still a problem 
in measuring control with an ad hoc threshold only. In fact control may also 
appear as a continuum. If it is doubtful that very small shareholdings alone 
provide control of the board, we should keep in mind, as recognized by the 
literature, that i) they may reach a majority collectively, or ii) they may be 
associated to board membership individually. Despite the acknowledgement 
of the influence of unique or multiple small shareholders on the selection 
of directors, this financial influence has been disregarded in both corporate 
governance and interlocking directorate empirical studies.
The contribution of this paper is to show that such an influence exists for 
a multiplicity of shareholdings among French corporations. We thus ana-
lyze the influence on the board composition of multiple shareowners dif-
ferentiated by their more or less important capital stake. For this purpose, 
we assess the correlation between a network of ownership ties and a net-
work of overlapping directorates among a set of public corporations. Here, 
two points are worth mentioning.
First, we do not use an ad hoc legal criterion of CFR or VR to postulate 
financial influence. Rather, we test a range of thresholds from 1% to 20% 
that may allow a shareholder to obtain a seat on the board, and thereby 
to take part in board decisions. By analyzing various thresholds, we are 
able to consider the influence obtained by multiple shareowners of a cor-
poration and not only by the first or the second one. With this method, 
we show that one of the most influential determinants of the formation 
of interlocking directorates is ownership linkages. It is important to pre-
cise that we do not claim that this correlation is the only symptom of 
control. However, it means that unique or multiple shareowners are able 
to influence board selection and appoint directors who will act on their 
behalf, either to improve their decision-making authority or their moni-
toring ability, alone or in collusion with entrants or incumbents.
Secondly, focusing on interlocking directorate and financial networks 
among corporations is particularly relevant for insider governance systems,5 
5 In an insider governance system, management and board decisions are controlled 
by blockholders, while in an outsider governance system market discipline is car-
ried out by outside shareholders through hostile takeovers (see Franks and Mayer, 
1997, 2001; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). In other words, according to Tirole (2006), 
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which are distinguished by the existence of multiple blockholdings by other 
financial and non-financial companies (see e.g. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 
2001, and Franks and Mayer, 2001, for Germany, and Franks et al., 2014, for 
Japan). We collect data from several sources to obtain reliable information 
on board structures and ultimate ownership structures of large French 
corporations, which are paragons of insider governance systems. Indeed, 
a dense and complex web of shareholdings exists among French corpora-
tions as a result of the waves of privatization that have occurred since the 
1980s. The declining government ownership in the main French compa-
nies was replaced in the 1990s by multiple core shareholdings between cor-
porations (the so-called noyaux durs) (Morin, 2000; Lantenois and Coriat, 
2011). Therefore, we can use these specific French connections to measure 
the correlation between multiple ownership ties and overlapping direc-
tors among firms. Like other shareowners, corporations vote for direc-
tors based on their voting rights. Our focus on ownership among French 
companies is an illustration of the general voting power associated with 
shareholding. Similar tests should be conducted on other countries with 
insider governance systems such as Germany and Japan where ownership 
networks are well-known.6 However, France offers the conditions of this 
experiment and its ownership networks are rarely studied (Morin, 2000) 
although French corporate governance has been the subject of an increas-
ing number of studies in the financial literature.7
Our focus on ownership and directorship ties among corporations is 
related to studies on this relationship occurring between financial and 
non-financial companies. Edwards and Nibler (2000) and Gorton and 
management choices are actively monitored by incumbents in insider systems and 
by entrants in outsider systems. Moreover, family and corporate blockholders enjoy 
both the public and private benefits of control in insider systems while outside 
share holders derive benefits only in the form of financial returns (Franks et al., 
2014). In Europe, as stressed by Faccio and Lang (2002) and Boutillier et al. (2002), 
ownership is more concentrated in countries like France, Germany and Italy (insi-
der governance systems), than in UK (outsider governance system).
6 See e.g. Franks and Mayer (1997, 2001), Morin (2000) and Goergen et al. (2008) for France 
and Germany, and Morck and Nakamura (1999), Aoki et al. (2007) and Franks et al. (2014) 
for Japan. See also references related to German governance below in the text.
7 For other references on French corporate governance, see Chikh and Filbien (2011), 
Ginglinger et al. (2011), Kramarz and Thesmar (2013), Murphy (2005), Bloch and 
Kremp (2001), and Franks and Mayer (1997).
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Schmidt (2000) demonstrate that the board structure of German firms 
is affected by bank shareholdings or by their voting power because they 
are able to appoint their representatives. Similarly, Franks and Mayer 
(2001) illustrate the representation of bankers on the boards of firms 
in which they hold shares or proxy votes while Dittmann et al. (2010) 
show that in 2000-2005 the sale by a German bank of its holding in a 
corporation was associated with the removal of its representative from 
the firm’s board. Morck and Nakamura (1999) also provide evidence on 
this ownership-board structure relationship, among banks and firms in 
Japan. Even in the US, banks are represented in firms in which they 
have voting power thanks to their fiduciary activities (Santos and 
Rumble, 2006). While financial studies tend to focus on the ownership-
board link between banks and firms, there is no available evidence on 
this relationship when it involves other financial firms such as insur-
ance companies, or when it occurs among non-financial corporations, 
which are also typical shareholders in insider governance systems. Our 
contribution evaluates the intensity of this ownership-board correlation 
considering all possible relationships between banks, insurance compa-
nies, and non-financial companies.
Our work also adds to the literature in financial economics which begins 
to consider interlocking directorates. Overlapping directors among cor-
porations have been receiving increased attention in financial stud-
ies, alongside consideration of networks in economics (Jackson, 2008). 
Renneboog and Zhao (2014), Stuart and Yim (2010) and Chikh and Filbien 
(2011) show that interlocking directorates facilitate M&A activities. 
Cai and Sevilir (2012) find that they explain the positive returns to the 
acquirer. Interlocks also contribute to diffusing board structure character-
istics (Bouwman, 2011) or stock option backdating practices (Bizjak et al., 
2009). Renneboog and Zhao (2011), Hwang and Kim (2009), Fich and White 
(2005) and Hallock (1997) study the effects of interlocks between CEOs, or 
between CEOs and directors, on CEO pay. Robinson and Stuart (2007) and 
Lindsey (2008) assess the impact of director networks and equity networks 
on strategic alliances. However, while ownership connections are poten-
tial determinants of interlocking directorates, there are no financial stud-
ies on this issue. Khanna and Thomas (2009) and Ferreira and Matos (2012) 
analyze both interlock and ownership ties, respectively between corpora-
tions and between banks and firms, to assess their effect on stock price 
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synchronization or on loan rates, but do not address the causality issue 
between equity and personal linkages. Our work aims to fill this gap by 
taking advantage of the panel structure of our data.
In the sociological literature, Comet and Pizarro (2011) compare network 
measures of capital network and interlocking directorates of French cor-
porations in 2006. Nevertheless, as shown by Mizruchi and Marquis 
(2006), assessing the correlation of network variables among organiza-
tions is more appropriate at a dyadic level of analysis, such as the one we 
use here (see below, section 1.1). Finally, one article is quite close to our 
empirical strategy: Bohman (2012), who assesses the probability that two 
firms are interlocked if they have a common shareholder. Our study con-
trols for this effect. However, shareholders can choose different represen-
tatives from their own board. Therefore, we can expect that the proba-
bility of being interlocked for two companies will be lower if they have a 
common shareholder than if one of these companies has equity stakes in 
the other. We find that interlocking directorates are better explained by 
ownership ties between two corporations than by the number of common 
shareholders in these two companies. Moreover, it is worth noting that 
we have to control for another specific common shareholder which is the 
French State. As explained by François and Lemercier (2014), French state-
owned-enterprises have always been well integrated in the French inter-
locking directorate network because of various factors we include in our 
study (like size or sector).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents 
the sample construction, data and empirical issues to be tested. Section 2 
describes the econometric method and the main results. Section 3 focuses 
on robustness tests. Section 4 concludes.
1. DATA AND EMPIRICAL TESTING ISSUES
We want to assess the correlation between ownership linkages and board 
connections after controlling for other possible determinants of interlock-
ing directorates. Shareowners may develop strategies aimed at influenc-
ing the composition of the board in order to determine manager selection 
and influence their subsequent conduct.
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1.1. Sample construction
The central empirical issue here is to assess the correlation between two 
kinds of networks: the network created by interlocking directorates and 
the network formed by companies’ ownership linkages. Constructing these 
networks is therefore the starting point of the sampling approach.
Since gathering reliable information on board composition and ownership 
linkages requires manually compiling annual reports, there is a limit to 
the number of firms that can be included in a panel dataset that spans 
a sufficiently long time period. Moreover, part of the information we 
need is available only for listed companies; in particular the publication 
of board structure is not mandatory for non-listed companies. Therefore, 
we cannot observe the entire network of firms’ interlocking directorates 
and, as usual in structural network analysis, we focus on a relevant sub-
network. We selected French companies in the CAC 40, the main Paris 
Stock Exchange index, which means that our results may be representa-
tive only of large listed corporations.8 The forty CAC 40 firms are selected, 
every quarter, from the 100 most traded firms on the Euronext Paris stock 
exchange. The selection criterion is capitalization provided that shares 
are liquid enough. Of course, there are entries and exits from the CAC 40 
index over the observation period (1997-2006); the sample is thus com-
posed of 61 companies that were listed in the CAC 40 for at least one quar-
ter between 1997 and 2006 (Table 1). The CAC 40 index is representative of 
the industries of the SBF 250 index, which is also constructed to be repre-
sentative of the Paris stock market.9
8 However, the number of missing nodes and links in this CAC 40 sub-network is 
likely to be small: super large companies do not share directors with small firms; 
and small companies cannot afford to purchase large shareholdings in the massive 
capitalizations composing the CAC 40. Our econometric results show also that there 
is a significant homophily effect in the CAC 40 network of interlocking directorates, 
which shows that CAC 40 firms tend to connect themselves with similar firms.
9 Representativity tests are available upon request. We implemented them year by year 
and for 4 sectoral categories in order to have a minimum of 5 observations by year 
and by category. The sectoral categories are aggregated according to the following 
1-digit SIC industrial sectors i) A, B, C, and D (Agriculture, Mining, Construction and 
Manufacturing); ii) F and G (Wholesale and Retail Trade); iii) E and I (Transportation, 
Communications, Utilities, and Services; iv) H (Finance, Insurance).
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The resulting number of firm-years observations is 507. However, because 
the dependent variable is the probability of having one or more interlock-
ing directors between any possible pair of firms in this sample, the regres-
sions are implemented over all possible dyads between the 61 firms. The 
61 firms provide 1,830 dyads (=61×60/2) but 20 firms are not listed over 
the entire 1997-2006 period, either because they entered the French stock 
exchange after 1997 or because they were delisted before 2006 (Table 1). We 
therefore implement our regressions on an unbalanced panel of 1,776 undi-
rected firm pairs (or dyads), with 12,611 dyad-year observations (Table 1, 
and Table 2 Panel B).
1.2. Dependent and independent variables
1.2.1. The dependent variable
It is impossible to measure directly whose interests a director represents, 
but it can be assumed that, if appointed to the boards of two or more com-
panies, this director will have to consider the interests of each one when 
exerting her power in another. We therefore construct a count variable 
equal to the number of interlocks between each firm dyad, and transform 
it into the following dummy variables: DU_INTERLOCK1=1 when the dyad 
has one single interlock, and DU_INTERLOCK_MIN2=1 when the dyad 
has at least two interlocks; the categorical variable INTERLOCKS ranges 
from 0 to 2 and is equal to 1 if DU_INTERLOCK1=1 and is equal to 2 if 
DU_INTERLOCK_MIN2=1. Table 2 panel B, describes the evolution of over-
lapping directors over the period under study. The information on board 
composition comes from firms’ annual reports and financial newspapers 
and is provided by the Dafsalien database. Board composition of Dafsalien 
is as of 31 December each year. We systematically checked, and if neces-
sary corrected, the information on whether the board chairman was also 
the firm’s CEO. We control for this in the regressions. Board identifica-
tion is obvious for the one-tier board systems prevailing in most incor-
porated companies since, in this case, there is only one board. However, 
some incorporated companies in the sample have a two-tier board system 
comprising a supervisory board and an executive board, and there are also 
two companies that are partnerships limited by shares (“Sociétés en com-
mandite par actions”) with supervisory boards and one or several managing 
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partners.10 For the former companies we consider only the interlocks 
involving the supervisory board because the executive board is nominated 
by the supervisory board which is chosen by the shareholders. For the lat-
ter, we consider the interlocks involving both the supervisory board and 
the managing partners.
1.2.2. Independent variables
The main independent variables are measures of ownership linkages. 
Several types of shareholding relationships between CAC 40 companies can 
generate interlocking directorates between them. We can expect that inter-
locking directorates between a pair of companies will be more probable if: 
i) one firm in the dyad holds shares in the other firm; ii) there are cross-
shareholdings between the firms forming the dyad; iii) a third shareholder 
(another listed firm or a private owner) holds shares in the two firms of the 
dyad. Two databases provide CFR for French firms: Thomson One Banker 
Ownership (TOBO) and Dafsaliens. Dafsaliens also identifies parent com-
panies and business group subsidiaries, which are required to track firms’ 
ultimate owners for each direct shareholding.11 We checked the archives 
of financial newspapers and the information provided on the web site of 
the French Authority of Financial Markets (AMF) regarding notification of 
major holdings. When the holding percentage of a particular shareowner 
differed across sources, we corrected aberrant numbers. We also obtained 
information on ownership from annual reports in order to check other 
data sources but also to collect VR figures, which are not reported in TOBO 
10 More detailed statistics on the distribution in the dataset of types of companies and 
board sizes are available on request. The share of two-tier board systems is dimi-
nishing from 2003, and the share of companies with separation of board chairman 
and CEO is growing constantly from 2000. Note also that board size depends on cor-
porate governance laws, and that the NRE law of 2001 obliged French companies to 
limit the number of board members to 18 within 3 years. This law also reduced the 
maximum number of a director’s simultaneous board memberships, from 8 to 5.
11 Tracking ultimate owners improves perception of the actual ownership network 
characterizing the firms in our sample: some CAC 40 firms have no direct owner-
ship linkages but do have indirect ownership ties when we consider the pyramidal 
chain of their multiple ultimate owners. However, we show in the robustness check 
section that the use of the ultimate owner methodology does not markedly change 
the results.
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or Dafsaliens.12 Where CFR were available in these two databases but not 
displayed in annual reports, we assumed that CFR equated with VR.13 All 
regressions presented include ownership linkages computed from CFR; the 
results were unchanged when we use VR instead of CFR.
We measure the three types of ownership linkages i), ii) and iii) referred 
to above with the following variables: DU_UNIL_CFR1 is equal to 1 if one 
of the two firms in the dyad holds a direct share of the stock capital of the 
other firm; DU_CROSS_CFR114 is equal to 1 if each firm in the dyad holds a 
share of the other firm’s CFR; IDEMOWNER is equal to the number of com-
mon private-sector shareholders in the dyad, and DU_STATE is equal to 1 
if the French State holds shares in both companies in the dyad. Similarly, 
we constructed the variable DU_UNIL_VR which is equal to 1 if one of the 
two firms in the dyad holds a direct share of the VR of the other firm, DU_
UNIL_CFR2 which is equal to 1 if one of the two firms in the dyad directly 
or indirectly holds a share of the CFR of the other firm, and so on. Finally, 
we split unilateral ownership ties to consider multiple VR or CFR cut-offs. 
For instance, the variables DU_UNIL_SUPα_CFR1 and DU_UNIL_INFα_
CFR1 refer to the existence of an ownership tie when it brings respectively 
more than α% of the CFR and less than α% of the CFR, where α can take 
the value of 20, 10, 5, 4, 3, 2 or 1. Table 2 panel B, presents the evolution of 
DU_UNIL_CFR1 and DU_CROSS_CFR1. We identify 560 unilateral owner-
ship ties among corporations, and 63 cases of cross-ownership.
We also construct control variables for the other possible determinants 
of interlocking directorates usually considered in the literature. First, 
12 Note also that, because of the 2006 European “transparency” directive, some VR 
figures are expressed as a percentage of total equity even if some of the shares were 
deprived of VR because, e.g. they were held by the actual company. In such cases, we 
recalculated VR on the basis of total outstanding shares.
13 This assumption is in line with Faccio and Lang’s (2000) study which shows that, in 
1996, 19.96% of stock capital was required to obtain a 20% of VR in French corpora-
tions. Nevertheless, as computed for companies of our sample, the first shareowner 
is required to hold an average of 17.89% of CFR to obtain 20% of VR during the sample 
period. Under French corporate law, double voting can be given to each share belon-
ging to the same shareholder for at least 2 years.
14 Under French corporate law no shareholding involved in cross-ownership can exceed 
10% of CFR but it can exceed 10% of VR due to double voting, which however is very 
rare in our sample (2 cases).
FRENCH CONNECTION: INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AND OWNERSHIP NETWORK
REVUE D ’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE ➻  N° 154  ➻  2 E TR IMESTRE 2016 189
in the economic literature, board reputation and directors’ expertise are 
considered important sources of interlocks (e.g. Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; 
Shivdasani, 1993; Bugeja et al., 2009; Adams et al., 2010): on the demand side 
of the director labor market, skilled directors are sought-after by manag-
ers and shareholders for the supplementary value brought by their exper-
tise; on the offer side, successful directors obtain supplementary director-
ships in other firms, which implies better compensation and creates an 
incentive to continue being efficient. As a consequence, firms whose board 
members are particularly renowned will exhibit more directorate inter-
locks. We control this effect with two variables for each dyad at time t: 
DEGREEit is the number of outside directorships held by firm i’s directors 
in other firms in the sample, and DEGREEjt is the number of outside direc-
torships held by firm j’s directors in other firms in the sample. Note that 
DEGREEit is simply the total number of firm i’s interlocks with all the 
other firms in the sample, and correspondingly for DEGREEjt. These two 
variables are proxies for the reputation of the board of each firm in the 
dyad ij. Since the total number of a firm’s interlocks has a greater prob-
ability to be important when board size is large, we need to introduce a 
measure of board size to filter the reputation effect measured by DEGREEit 
and DEGREEjt. We therefore introduce the variable BOARDSIZE which is 
equal to the sum of the board sizes of both firms in the dyad. In addi-
tion, it can be expected that board members of CAC 40 firms possess spe-
cial expertise on this kind of very large listed firm. This implies that the 
same small group of persons could compose the talent pool of large capi-
talizations’ boards. It is thus likely that there exists an homophily effect 
on interlocking directorates: firms that belong to the very selective club 
of CAC 40 firms tend to use the same talent pool to select their directors, 
and this professional elite will tend to prefer CAC 40 firms (see, e.g. Mace, 
1971; Mizruchi, 1996; Burris, 2005; Conyon and Muldoon, 2006). We assess 
this homophily effect with the dyadic variable DISTANCETOCAC equal to 
the absolute value of the difference between the number of years that 
firm i has been in the CAC 40 over the sampling period, minus the num-
ber of years that firm j was in the CAC 40 over the sampling period.15 A 
high DISTANCETOCAC means low degree of homophily, and this variable 
therefore should have a negative impact on the probability that boards i 
and j are interlocked.
15 The time in the CAC 40 is divided by the number of years the firm is present in the 
sample, for each firm in the dyad.
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Another important rationale for interlocking directorates is cost-ben-
efit optimization along various dimensions. Firms have to get access to 
resources and markets at the lowest costs, and they also have to reduce 
transaction and information costs as often as possible. Several studies 
show that sharing directors with suppliers and customers reduces these 
costs (see, e.g., Booth and Deli, 1996; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Hillman 
et al., 2000). A similar argument is that firms may plan strategic alliances 
with suppliers, customers, or competitors operating in the same markets 
to try to reduce costs or to alleviate competitive pressures. Since strate-
gic alliances often necessitate mutual control, this may generate intra-
industry interlocks. Therefore, the probability of interlocking directorates 
should be higher if firms belong to the same industry sector.16 To account 
for these alliance-related interlocks we create two dummy variables 
DU_IDEMSIC and DU_FIN2: the first is equal to 1 if the two firms in the 
dyad are non-financial firms belonging to the same 2-digit SIC industrial 
sector; the second is equal to 1 if the two firms are financial companies. 
Firms also want to secure bank funding at the best possible price. Again, 
this may produce interlocks because banks send directors to large debt-
ors to reduce problems of asymmetric information, and large borrowers 
try to be represented on banks’ boards to obtain better financing condi-
tions.17 However, this may also prevent interlocks because banks are aware 
of potential conflicts of interests and do not want to become captive mon-
itors (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). We assess this effect with the dummy 
DU_FIN1 which is equal to 1 when only one of the two firms is a financial 
company.18
We also need to address the specificity of CEO interlocks. First, there is evi-
dence that CEOs are particularly eager to sit on each other’s boards because 
16 This expected effect could be mitigated by the fact that the benefits of collusion/
alliances/market concentrations are inverted U-shaped, that is to say week in com-
petitive markets as well as in very concentrated ones. In further works, we should 
add more precise measures of the concentration of the markets of the firm dyads to 
account for this.
17 Evidence on this point is provided e.g. by Morck and Nakamura (1999), Byrd and 
Mizruchi (2005), Santos and Rumble (2006), Güner et al. (2008), Dittmann et al. 
(2010), and Ferreira and Matos (2012).
18 Note that insurance companies are included in the category “financial companies” 
because, like in Germany, they are important providers of equity for French corpo-
rations and this may generate overlapping directors.
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it provides job security and higher compensation (see e.g., Hallock, 1997; 
Fich and White, 2005; Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013; Adams et al., 2010). It 
might be suspected that our results for all interlocks are driven by CEOs 
interlocks. To check this, we re-run all the regressions with modified 
dependent variables, excluding CEO interlocks from the count of interlock-
ing directorates (see “Robustness check 1” in next section). While man-
agers’ entrenchment strategies may produce CEO interlocks, they do not 
necessarily favor the formation of interlocks between non-CEO directors: 
managers may prefer a degree of closure of the firm’s governance sys-
tem to avoid the introduction of external directors that could challenge 
their decisions. If so, then the more powerful the CEO in the firm the less 
likely will be the nomination of outside directors keen to monitor his or 
her actions. Therefore, we can expect a negative correlation between mea-
sures of boards’ closure and the probability of interlocking directorates. 
We introduce two variables to address this problem. The first is a measure 
of board independence, DU_NODUALITY, which is equal to 1 if both firms 
have adopted the rule that the CEO cannot be the chairman of the board. 
We expect a positive effect on interlocks probabilities. The second variable 
is a dyadic measure of ownership concentration, C1MEAN, which is equal 
to the average voting rights held by the two main shareholders of the two 
companies. The existence of controlling shareowners should have a nega-
tive impact on interlock probabilities because such large blockholders will 
not easily accept sharing power with other firms.19
2. ECONOMETRIC METHOD AND RESULTS
Since our main dependent variable, INTERLOCKS, is a dyadic categorical 
variable, it is natural to use multinomial logit models in this context. The 
panel structure of our dataset allows us to account for time dependence: in 
19 This might depend on the characteristics of these controlling shareowners. However, 
because we had to adopt a dyadic approach, it was not possible to introduce a rich 
array of variables accounting for the characteristics of control investors as done, for 
example, in La Porta et al. (1999). The difficulty is that, when the two members of a 
dyad have different qualitative characteristics, it is often impossible to synthesize 
them in a single dyadic variable. This also explains why we used a reduced number 
of sectoral variables. We therefore acknowledge that this is a limitation of the pres-
ent results and we hope to find solutions in further works.
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all the regressions, we introduce the nine time dummies corresponding to 
our 1997-2006 observation period. The panel structure may however gener-
ate autocorrelation within each firm dyad, and heteroskedasticity between 
dyads. That is why we systematically adjust standard errors for clustering at 
dyad level with the Huber-White correction. There is also a specific autocor-
relation issue generated by the dyadic nature of the dependent variable: con-
sidering that we have n firms and n×(n-1)/2 dyads, errors are autocorrelated 
between dyads because any firm i present in dyad ij is also present in the n-1 
other possible dyads that include firm i. As a consequence, any unobserved 
characteristic of firm i that would fall into the error term εij could also be 
present in the errors εik (k=1…(n-1); k#j) related to firm i. The simplest way 
to address this problem is inspired by gravity models of foreign trade flows 
(see, e.g., Mátyás, 1997) and consists of introducing weights variables mea-
suring the gravity of each firm in each dyad (see, e.g. Hoekman et al., 2010, 
who apply the same methodology to scientific collaboration networks). The 
already described variables DEGREEit and DEGREEjt which control for repu-
tation effect provide the required gravity measures. We introduce time aver-
aged degrees, AVDEGREEi and AVDEGREEj as firm fixed effects. Since the 
model includes a distance measure as well (the variable DISTANCETOCAC 
described above), it is rather similar to a gravity model.
Table 3 displays the results – odd ratios and standard errors – of the mul-
tinomial logit regressions of the categorical variable INTERLOCKS on the 
ownership and control variables described above. The Log Pseudolikelihood 
and other usual statistics not displayed here show that the overall fit of 
the model is satisfactory. The Small-Hsiao tests validate the assumption of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. All regressions are implemented 
for the period 1997-2006 on 1,776 firm dyads, resulting in an unbalanced 
panel of 12,611 dyad-year observations.
The odds of having one interlocking directorates rather than zero, and 
at least two interlocking directorates rather than zero, are strongly and 
positively affected by the three forms of ownership linkages. For exam-
ple, if one of the two dyad firms holds at least 20% of the shares of the 
other firm, the odds of having one interlock rather than zero are multi-
plied by 10.92 and the odds of having two or more interlocks change by 
a factor of 92.09. The factor change coefficients of the ownership vari-
ables DU_UNIL, DU_CROSS, DU_UNIL_SUP, and DU_UNIL_INF are much 
larger than the coefficients of the other significant variables. These results 
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unambiguously evidence that interlocking directorates are strongly corre-
lated to ownership linkages, which can be interpreted as evidence that 
ownership ties are used to produce monitoring or control linkages. As 
already discussed, this result counters the view that control or influence 
is separated from ownership. On this sample of firms, stock owners seem 
to be able to achieve nominations of directors that will represent their 
interests. We also obtain that the variable DU_UNIL_INF is significant 
in all cases, showing that even small shareholdings very much increase 
the odds of having interlocks.20 Also, even if the percentage of sharehold-
ings between the firms in the dyad is very small (Table 3 columns 9 to 12), 
the coefficients of factor change are more important than the other sig-
nificant variables. However, the Wald tests displayed under Table 3 (note 
(5) “UNIL≥α vs. UNIL< α”) show that, for all outcomes and all ownership 
thresholds except the 1% limit, the coefficients of the dummy measur-
ing large blockholdings are always significantly greater than the coeffi-
cients of the dummy measuring small blockholdings. Here again, owner-
ship appears to be an important determinant of monitoring or control ties 
since the higher is the ownership linkage, the higher will be the ability 
to affect the course of action of a firm thanks to interlocked directorates.
Regarding multiple interlocks, we obtain that the odds of having at least 
two rather than zero interlocks increase by a factor 11.89 when two firms 
have a unilateral ownership linkage. This could be interpreted as evidence 
that some shareowners seek to improve their control power or their mon-
itoring capacity by obtaining more than one devoted director. Moreover, 
the theory predicts that decision-making authority might be sought by 
both large and small blockholders. If these shareholders have a real incen-
tive to seek such control power, then multiple interlocks are likely to be 
even more strongly correlated to ownership linkages than single inter-
locks. The Wald tests (notes (3), (4), (6) and (7) to Table 3) provide clear evi-
dence supporting this proposition: all ownership linkage variables tested 
affect the odds of having multiple interlocks more than those of having 
a single interlock, and according to the Wald Chi2 statistics, these differ-
ences are always significant.
20 If we use VR instead of CFR, DU_UNIL_INF no longer explains the existence of one 
interlock for the 1% threshold. It suggests that some small shareholders benefit from 
double voting which allows them to have more than 1% of the VR. Shareholdings 
below the 1% cut-off of CFR but without double voting are not a determinant of single 
interlocks but still explain multiple interlocks.
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Finally, we can see on Table 3 that cross-ownership has a higher impact 
on the odds of having multiple interlocking directorates than a unilateral 
stake. Indeed, this specific corporate ownership lock-in device changes the 
odds of having at least two interlocks by a factor of 85.34 whereas unre-
ciprocated ownership changes the odds by a factor 11.89. The Wald test 
(note (4) to Table 3) shows that this difference is significant. Moreover, 
notice that the difference between unilateral and cross-ownership is 
not significantly different from zero in the case of a single interlock. 
Therefore, cross-ownership seems to have a particular influence on mul-
tiple overlapping directors, possibly reflecting the control purpose of this 
ownership lock-in device.
Before commenting on the control variables, it is also useful to notice 
that common ownership by a third party, measured by the variables 
IDEMOWNER and DU_STATE, has a much lower effect on board interlock-
ing between a pair of firms than the existence of unilateral or cross-own-
ership linkages between them.
In relation to the control variables, the factor change coefficients are in 
line with what is predicted in the literature. First, even after control-
ling for board size,21 our measures of board reputation and competence 
(DEGREEit and DEGREEjt) display coefficients that are significant and 
greater than 1. Similarly, the inverted measure of similarity between 
pairs of firms (DISTANCETOCAC) has the expected significant and less 
than 1 factor change coefficient. The dummy DU_FIN1 (equal to 1 if one 
and only one of the two firms is a financial company) has a significant 
and less than 1 factor change coefficient, which means that pairs of finan-
cial and non-financial companies have fewer interlocking directorates 
than pairs of non-financial companies belonging to different sectors: in 
line with the argument in Kroszner and Strahan (2001), financial com-
panies seem to avoid interlocking directorates with potential customers 
21 Note that BOARDSIZE, which is a natural control variable for interlocking directo-
rates, is significant only if the companies have one overlapping director. This effect 
disappears if the dyad has at least two interlocks. In other words, controlling ties 
between corporations must be explained by other factors than the natural deter-
minant of interlocking directorates. The effect of BOARDSIZE is significantly dif-
ferent from zero for at least two interlocks only when we remove the board reputa-
tion variables DEGREEit and DEGREEjt.
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because they want to avoid potential conflicts of interests. The idea that 
industry alliances will generate interlocks is not supported in this sam-
ple: we find non-significant factor change coefficients for the dummy 
DUIDEMSIC designed to detect alliances between two non-financial firms; 
the dummy DU_FIN2 constructed to detect alliances between financial 
firms, shows significantly reduced odds ratios but only for the multiple 
interlock outcome. Finally, our measures of board openness (C1MEAN and 
DU_NODUALITY) are not significant.
3. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We now have to address several potential shortcomings of the above esti-
mates: 1) the results may be driven by CEO interlocks, and therefore may 
reflect a managerial entrenchment strategy rather than the possibility for 
the corporate owner to have directors who will act on its behalf; 2) mea-
sures of direct ownership linkages may not capture correctly the reality of 
ownership connections; 3) the causality between ownership linkages and 
human linkages (interlocks) may be inverted. In that perspective, we con-
duct a series of robustness checks that we only present in a summarized 
way here. The detailed Tables of results are available upon request.
3.1. Robustness check 1: Are the results driven 
by CEO interlocks?
Although our measures of board openness (DU_NODUALITY and C1MEAN) 
do not have significant effects on the odds of having interlocked direc-
tors, which suggests that managerial entrenchment is not driving the 
results, we check whether removing CEO interlocks changes the find-
ings. The regressions estimated are similar to the above ones, except that 
the dependent variable is now constructed excluding CEO interlocks.22 In 
the results obtained, the only noticeable modification is that the factor 
change coefficients of the variable DU_CROSS_CFR1 are no longer signif-
icant, which means that the positive impact of cross-shareholdings on 
interlocking directorates was driven by CEO interlocks. This modification 
22 The count variable INTERLOCKS takes the value zero if CEOs sit on each other’s 
boards.
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can be interpreted in two ways: 1) either managers use cross-ownership as 
a means of obtaining a position on each other’s boards for entrenchment 
purpose; or 2) they promote cross-shareholdings when they sit on each 
other’s boards.23 However, the main finding that control is proportional 
to ownership does not come from CEO interlocks.
3.2. Robustness check 2: varying the measures 
of ownership linkages
In the results presented in Table 3, ownership connections are mea-
sured on the basis of direct CFR figures. However, pyramid structures24 
and cross-shareholdings mean that indirect owners may be eligible for 
board membership either because they ultimately control a direct share-
holding or because they contribute to pyramid structure used to control 
it. Consequently, accounting for these indirect owners may change the 
correlation between ownership connections and board interlocks. We uti-
lize the information on parent companies and group subsidiaries provided 
in annual reports and the Dafsaliens database to investigate ownership 
chains and compute indirect CFR. In that perspective, we make several 
methodological choices. First, we apply this approach not to VR but to CFR, 
which means that we implement a linear not a threshold methodology 
(Vitali et al., 2011). Secondly, while all ultimate controlling owners were 
identified for each shareholding, they could not be included in the regres-
sions if the companies were not listed on the CAC 40 over the 1997-2006 
observation period. The reason for this selection is the dyadic approach 
employed here: the ownership connections matrix and the interlocking 
23 It is worth noting that Yeo et al. (2003) find a positive relationship between CEOs 
interlocks and firms’ performance in France in 1999, suggesting that cross-owner-
ship and CEOs interlocks were probably not used to increase the consumption of pri-
vate benefits of control.
24 In Faccio and Lang’s (2002) study, in 15.7% of cases, French firms with a 20% control-
ling shareholder are controlled by a pyramid structure. In our data, this frequency 
is 22.5% of firms with a 20% controlling owner. When the first shareowner holds 
at least 10% or 5% of the VR, there is a pyramid structure in respectively 21.2% and 
26.6% of cases. The frequency rises to 30.8% of our year-firm sample if we consider 
all first shareowners even if they hold less than 5% of the VR. Consequently, the use 
of a pyramid by the first shareholder seems to increase with ownership dispersion, 
suggesting that this structure plays an important role for various capital thresholds 
of main French corporations.
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directorates’ matrix have to be of same size and composed of the same 
firms.
For each year we compute a matrix Y of direct and indirect CFR according 
to the formula.25
where X = (xi,j)1 ≤ i,j ≤ n; xi,j is the percentage of direct CFR held by i over j; 





 . α is the number of links considered in the own-
ership chain and In is the unit matrix of size n = (min = 142; max = 188). This 
formula generates more than 2000 direct and indirect shareholdings 
between corporations belonging to the CAC 40 index. We consider indirect 
ownership ties only if they bring at least 0.25% of the CFR, which is equiv-
alent to an ownership chain with two links of 5%. As a result of this inclu-
sion of indirect ownership ties between the sample firms, the number of 
unilateral ties increases from 560 to 714, and the number of cross-share-
holdings rises from 63 to 84.
We then re-estimate the multinomial logit equations, replacing the 
independent variables DU_UNIL_CFR1, DU_CROSS_CFR1, DU_UNIL_
SUP_CFR1, DU_UNIL_INF_ CFR1 by DU_UNIL_CFR2, DU_CROSS_CRF2, 
DU_UNIL_SUP_CRF2, DU_UNIL_INF_CRF2 computed with direct and indi-
rect CFR instead of direct CFR. To save space, the results are not displayed 
here but can be provided upon request. We obtain that the significance 
of the odds ratios and Wald tests is not affected by this change. The level 
25 Another possible approach is to exclude direct participations when the indirect 
owners of the direct owners benefit from the integrality of the CFR of the latter. In 
this case, the ownership ties matrix is :
 Z=DY
where D = diag(U - S), U is the unit row vector and S = (sj)1 ≤ j ≤ n is a row vector whose 
elements are:                 . However we did not adopt this approach because it sup-
presses direct ownership connections which are shown to be effective determinants 
of board interlocks. Similar methodologies are used and discussed in, e.g., Brioschi 
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of some odds ratios is slightly modified but not in a way that changes the 
interpretation of the results.
3.3. Robustness check 3: addressing the endogeneity 
of ownership ties and board connections
The causality between ownership linkages and human linkages (inter-
locks) may be inverted because directors sitting on several boards may 
encourage companies to hold shares in these firms. A simple and prelim-
inary way to address this issue is to lag the ownership linkage variables 
in the regressions.26 We lag the variables DU_UNIL_CFR1, DU_CROSS_
CFR1, DU_UNIL_SUP_CFR1, DU_UNIL_INF_CFR1, IDEMOWNER and 
DU_STATE by one year and three years. Since current interlocks cannot 
cause past ownership linkages, if the latter have a significant impact on 
present interlocks this can be interpreted as evidence that there is cau-
sality from ownership ties to board linkages, even if the reverse causality 
is also present at time t. The factor change coefficients of the ownership 
connection variables remain large and significant even in the specifica-
tions with a three year lag. However, their level is sometimes reduced in 
comparison to the corresponding coefficients in Table 3. Therefore, even if 
past ownership ties increase the odds of interlocks, suggesting that at least 
part of the causality goes from ownership ties to board interlocks, we can-
not exclude that the larger contemporaneous correlation is due to a partial 
inversion of contemporaneous causality.
Thus, we investigate this issue further using instrumented versions of our 
multinomial logit regressions. Two instrumental variables techniques can 
be implemented to correct for endogeneity biases in nonlinear models: 
the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method and the two-stage predic-
tor substitution (2SPS) approach. Both methods use consistent first stage 
regressions to instrument the variables that are supposed to be endoge-
nous. In 2SPS, the results of the first stage regressions are used to gen-
erate predicted values for the endogenous variables. The second-stage 
regression is conducted after replacing the endogenous variables by their 
predicted values. In 2SRI, the endogenous variables are not replaced in the 
second-stage regression. Instead, the first-stage residuals are included as 
26 These regressions, not displayed here for space reasons, are available upon request.
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additional regressors. If their coefficients are significant, endogeneity is 
confirmed. Terza et al. (2008) show that, in contrast to the 2SPS estimator, 
the 2SRI estimator is consistent for non-linear models such as the multi-
nomial logit we use in this paper whereas the 2SPS estimator can generate 
substantial bias that is not attenuated by large sample size. We thus chose 
the 2SRI method for the re-estimation of our model.
The outcomes of the 2SRI re-estimation of the first interlock equation of 
Table 3 with the variables DU_CROSS_CFR1 considered potentially endog-
enous suggests rejecting the hypothesis that DU_CROSS_CFR1, DU_UNIL_
SUP5_CFR1 and DU_UNIL_INF5_CFR1 are endogenous. We can conclude 
that the specifications in Table 3 for which we could implement the 
2SRI method are not biased by an endogeneity problem. However, we do 
acknowledge that the large number of observations required to implement 
this technique with internal instruments and bootstrapped residuals did 
not allow us to implement the test in the specifications with the largest 
ownership thresholds (more than 10% or 20% of shares).
In summary, this series of robustness tests provides convincing supple-
mentary evidence supporting the results displayed in Table 3: varying 
ownership measures, removing CEOs interlocks, or addressing potential 
endogeneity problems does not change our conclusions. However, the 
exclusion of CEO interlocks from the dependent variable changes results 
for cross-ownership: the strong correlation between cross-ownership ties 
and board interlocks is driven by CEO interlocks, which can be interpreted 
as evidence of a managerial entrenchment strategy.
4. CONCLUSION
The aim of this article was to show that the network of overlapping direc-
tors and the network of shareholding linkages between large French listed 
corporations are highly correlated. We show first that both large and 
small ownership linkages across companies, from 20% to 1% of CFR or VR, 
are strong predictors of overlapping directors among these corporations. 
The impact of ownership ties on interlocking directorates is clearly stron-
ger than the other potential determinants of overlapping directors we 
could measure (reputation and competences of board members, homoph-
ily, board size and openness, sectoral effects).
FRENCH CONNECTION: INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AND OWNERSHIP NETWORK
REVUE D ’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE ➻  N° 154  ➻  2 E TR IMESTRE 2016202
This result is congruent with studies on controlling shareholders because 
we show that the probability that two firms are interlocked is increased 
more if one of them holds a large stake in the other than if it holds a 
small stake. Nevertheless, since we also find that small shareholdings can 
create interlocking directorates our work underlines the need to consider 
not only the first or the second shareholder but also the entire ownership 
structure, particularly when it involves other listed companies. A second 
important contribution is that we show that large and small sharehold-
ings are even more strongly correlated with multiple than single inter-
locks. We interpret multiple interlocks between two companies as a sig-
nal that at least one of the two connected corporations seeks to improve 
its influence, i.e. its decision-making authority or its monitoring ability. 
Finally, we show that our results are not biased by endogeneity problems 
which might be due to causality issues: ownership linkages are the main 
determinant of interlocking directorates, and not the reverse.
The main implication of these findings is that ownership remains the main 
way to gain influencing or controlling power even if this is for manage-
rial entrenchment purposes in the case of cross-ownership. Disentangling 
the positive and negative effects of locking board structures thanks to 
ownership between corporations is beyond the scope of this paper. Some 
may argue that it weakens market discipline and competitive constraints 
while others may claim that it provides the required stability for long 
term investment. Whatever the purpose of corporate blockholders, it is 
quite safe to say that the financial density we highlight in this article 
is a structural feature of French capitalism. Thirty years after the first 
study on ownership structure in France (Morin, 1974) we still identify a 
strong ownership network among corporations for the period 1997 to 2006, 
despite the decline of cross-ownership ties that happened during the nine-
ties. We can fairly well suppose that this pattern has not changed sig-
nificantly after 2007-08 since the financial crisis was associated with a 
concentration of ownership in many countries, especially in banking. Of 
course these conclusive statements require more research on both the evo-
lution of the French ownership network and its consequences on corporate 
governance, competition and investment.
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